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GROSSLY EXCESSIVE ATTORNEY'S FEE REQUESTS
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS
ACT: SHOULD THE ENTIRE FEE REQUEST BE DENIED?
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of civil rights in our society is underscored by
the availability of legal redress to individuals who have suffered a
deprivation of those rights.I The vindication of civil rights, however,
often depends upon the people least able to afford the legal fees
involved in commencing a civil rights action. 2 While contingent fee
arrangements! may provide personal injury plaintiffs who cannot
afford counsel the opportunity to have their day in court, such
arrangements generally do not entice lawyers to accept civil rights
cases that "frequently involve substantial expenditures of time and
effort but produce only small monetary recoveries." '4 Accordingly,
the "vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations [cannot]
* . . present their cases to the courts." 5
In an effort to provide these victims with effective access to the
judicial process, 6 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee
I. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
2. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577 (1986) (citing 122 CONG. REC.
31832 (1976)).
3. A contingent fee is one that is contingent upon the outcome of the matter for
which the attorney's services are being rendered. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983) (amended 1993). The fee generally consists of a
percentage of the plaintiff's recovery. Id.
4. City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 577. In a contingent fee arrangement, a small
monetary recovery for a plaintiff translates into a small fee for the plaintiff's
attorney. See supra note 3.
5. City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 576 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th.
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5910).
6. Id.
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Awards Act of 1976 (the Act).7 Because the Act grants district courts
the discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees' to the prevailing
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Specifically, § 1988(b) of the Act
provides as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1981(a), 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id. § 1988(b). Prior to enactment of the Act, the traditional American rule
prohibited a prevailing party from collecting attorney's fees from the losing
party. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 182 (1976) (refusing to
award attorney's fees to prevailing civil rights litigants in absence of a statute
expressly authorizing such award); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (same). Because Congress believed, however,
that an individual who commences a civil rights action acts as a 'private
attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considerfs] of the highest
importance," City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 575 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-
1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5910
(quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)), it
asserted that awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing parties in civil rights
litigation was essential. See id. at 576 (citing S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5910).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "[Ulnless special circumstances would render such
an award unjust," the prevailing party should "ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5912 (quoting
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). Although the
party requesting attorney's fees is typically a prevailing plaintiff, a prevailing
defendant may also be awarded attorney's fees under the Act if the litigation
to which it is a party is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Christiansburg Garment v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Thus, the burden
that a defendant must meet before receiving an award of attorney's fees is
higher than that which must be met by a plaintiff, who must only prevail in
some aspect of the litigation to receive such an award. See id. at 417, 419,
422. Although Christiansburg involved attorney's fees under 35 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k), rather than under the Act, the Court generally construes similar language
in fee shifting statutes alike. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638,
2640 (1992). But cf. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033 (1994)
(holding that the defendant need only prevail in order to recover attorney's
fees in a Copyright Act case). Despite the similarities between the fee shifting
language of the Copyright Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 505, and the Act, the
Fogerty Court opined that the goals and objectives of the Civil Rights statute
and the Copyright statute are distinguishable. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1028.
Because the Act reflects a congressional desire for "private attorneys general,"
the higher standard imposed upon prevailing defendants in civil rights litigation
is justified. Id. This distinction was downplayed by Justice Thomas in his
concurring opinion in Fogerty, in which he argued that virtually identical
language should be construed similarly and that prevailing defendants should
only have to meet the same burden as prevailing plaintiffs to receive an award
of attorney's fees in civil rights cases. Id. at 1034-36 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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parties 9 in civil rights litigation, attorneys are more willing to represent
impoverished persons with legitimate civil rights grievances. 0
Notwithstanding the district court's seemingly unfettered discre-
tion to award attorney's fees under the Act, questions have arisen
regarding the appropriate amount of these awards. While the Act
provides that district courts have the ability to award "a reasonable
attorney's fee,"" it offers no guidance as to when fees should be
considered unreasonable or grossly excessive.' As a result, district
courts are left to fashion their own definition of grossly excessive
fees.
The Act also fails to address the consequences that a client and
the client's attorney might face if the attorney submits a grossly
excessive fee request. 3 If the request for attorney's fees is deemed
grossly excessive, may the district court deny payment of all fees, or
should the court reduce the excessive fees to a reasonable amount?
Even if the requested fees are not deemed grossly excessive, should
a district court deny any portion of the fees that it believes is
inappropriate or unjustified?
To answer these and other questions, this Comment first ex-
amines the guidance that the United States Supreme Court has
provided regarding the reasonableness of attorney's fees in civil rights
litigation. Because this guidance is not conclusory as to grossly
excessive fees, this Comment also examines how various jurisdictions
have defined and/or dealt with grossly excessive fee requests made
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Under the provisions of the Act, if the prevailing
party is a pro se plaintiff, attorney's fees are not recoverable even if the pro
se plaintiff is an attorney. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991). The refusal
to award attorney's fees to a pro se plaintiff is predicated upon the Court's
belief that Congress intended for civil rights litigants to retain counsel to ensure
the "effective prosecution of meritorious claims." See id. at 437.
10. City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 578.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A reasonable attorney's fee may include fees for
experts utilized by the prevailing party in the litigation. Id. § 1988(c) (Supp.
111 1991). Although the trial court must ultimately calculate the amount of
reasonable attorney's fees, the prevailing party has the burden of proving that
the amount requested is reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Although Hensley
did not address how this burden might be satisfied, at a minimum, the fee
applicant should support the fee request with contemporaneous records of the
time expended on the prevailing party's case. See infra notes 67, 145 and
accompanying text. The prevailing party should also make a good faith effort
to exclude from the fee request hours or expenses which are excessive, redun-
dant, or otherwise unnecessary. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. See infra notes 50-
51, 134-35, 146 and accompanying text discussing circumstances in Which courts
have determined that the hours or expenses contained within a prevailing
party's fee request were excessive, redundant, and/or unnecessary.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
13. See id.
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pursuant to the Act. This Comment then explores the appropriateness
of the remedies utilized by these jurisdictions to deal with grossly
excessive fee requests, and suggests alternative remedies to further
the Act's goal of providing effective judicial access to civil rights
plaintiffs while preventing civil rights attorneys from receiving a
windfall when their client is the prevailing party. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes with a recognition of the importance of these goals
and the realization that the Supreme Court is unlikely to address the
issue of grossly excessive fees under the Act until there is a true split
among the federal circuits.
II. WHEN WILL FEES BE CONSIDERED GROSSLY
EXCESSIVE?
A. Supreme Court Guidelines
Although many civil rights cases that have come before the
Court involved requests for attorney's fees by the prevailing party, 4
the Court has not yet made its own pronouncement on the assessment
and treatment of grossly excessive fee requests under the Act. The
Court has not defined a grossly excessive fee request, nor has it
addressed whether a district court may deny reasonable attorney's
fees when the prevailing party's fee request is deemed grossly exces-
sive. The Court has, however, instructed the lower courts of the
appropriate method for calculating a reasonable attorney's fee. 5
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,'6 the Supreme Court endorsed the twelve
factor reasonableness test established by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.' 7 (the Johnson Factors) as the
appropriate method for calculating a reasonable fee in civil rights
litigation.'" The Johnson Factors are as follows: (1) the time and
14. See Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992); West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc.
v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991); City of
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
(1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S.
122 (1980); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
15. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
16. Id. The plaintiffs in Hensley filed a request for attorney's fees under the Act
after prevailing on certain claims of constitutional violations at a Missouri
state hospital. Id. at 426.
17. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-30 n.3. The calculation of a reasonable fee should
begin with the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied
by a reasonable hourly rate, id. at 433, the result of which is sometimes
referred to as the "lodestar" amount. Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d
838, 839 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984). A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market
[Vol. 24
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labor required; (2) the novelty and the difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circum-
stances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the "unde-
sirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship; and (12) awards in similar cases. 19 In Hensley, the Court
placed the greatest importance on the eighth Johnson Factor, which
measures the degree of success obtained by a plaintiff. 0 Under the
Act, however, a plaintiff does not have to be successful on all of its
claims to receive attorney's fees as the prevailing party.2' Rather, if
a plaintiff succeeds on any significant issue, thereby achieving some
of its goals in bringing suit, reasonable attorney's fees may be
awarded .22
rate in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)
(holding that the prevailing market rate applies whether the plaintiff is repre-
sented by private or non-profit counsel). But cf. New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that when litigation is lengthy, the reasonable hourly rate should be that which
was in effect during the litigation, and not the hourly rate in effect at the
conclusion of the case).
19. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. Both houses of Congress referred to the Johnson
Factors when the Act was enacted. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-30. The Johnson
Factors are substantially similar to the factors for determining a reasonable
fee set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model Rules).
The factors in the Model Rules are:
1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; 2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services; 4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the time
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 6) the nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client; 7) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the service; and 8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983) (amended 1993).
The Model Rules have been adopted by more than two-thirds of the jurisdictions
in this country and have largely supplemented their predecessor, the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code). ABA, ANNOTATED
* MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1-2 (J.P. Gray ed., 2d ed. 1992).
Although the Model Code prohibited clearly excessive fees, id. at 71, the Model
Rules do not distinguish between excessive and grossly excessive fees. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983) (amended 1993).
20. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435-36.
21. Id. at 433-36.
22. Id. at 435. Similarly, prevailing parties in pre-trial settlements may be awarded
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If a plaintiff's unsuccessful claims originate from the same
common core of facts as the plaintiff's successful claims, thereby
making it difficult to separate the hours which the plaintiff's counsel
expended on a claim-by-claim basis, the district court should "focus
on the significance of the overall relief obtained . . . in relation to
the hours reasonably expended in the litigation."' 23 The fee award
should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff did not prevail
on every claim. 24 As long as the plaintiff obtains "excellent results,"
the plaintiff's attorney should recover the entire amount of reasonable
attorney's fees. 25
Where "exceptional success" has been achieved, the prevailing
party's attorney may also be awarded a bonus, or an "enhanced
award." ' 26 Decisions subsequent to Hensley, however, indicate that
attorney's fees if they achieve a significant measure of the results sought.
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980). The plaintiff in Maher challenged
certain regulations governing Connecticut's Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program, alleging that her level of benefits under that program was
reduced when she was denied credit for substantial portions of her work-related
expenses. Id. at 124. Because a pre-trial settlement provided the plaintiff with
a substantial increase in her benefits, she achieved a significant measure of the
results sought, and an award of attorney's fees was therefore appropriate. Id.
at 126.
23. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
24. Id. Although the court should determine reasonable attorney's fees based on
the prevailing party's overall success, in a plurality opinion the Supreme Court
recognized that the attorney's fees do not have to be proportional to the actual
damages received by the plaintiff. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,
576 (1986).
25. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Although the Court did not elaborate on what might
constitute "excellent results," it referred to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975), as a case where the fee
award was partially based on the excellent results obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 431. Although the Swann plaintiffs were not successful on all of their
claims, they succeeded in obtaining the complete desegregation of the Charlotte-
Mecklenberg school district, despite widespread opposition to the their cause.
Swann, 66 F.R.D. at 484-85. Such opposition included the President of the
United States, Congress, the state government, and the local school board. Id.
at 485. Under the circumstances, the plaintiffs obtained "essentially complete
relief." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431.
26. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Because the Hensley Court did not elaborate on
when a success would be exceptional enough to justify the award of a bonus
to the prevailing party's counsel, it is helpful to examine the circumstances
under which a bonus has previously been awarded. In Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Sec. (CCH) 9444 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 1974), the
plaintiffs obtained a court order which required the Los Angeles County Fire
Department to institute an affirmative-action program for hiring minorities.
Id. 9444, at 5047-48. Although the plaintiffs were not successful on all of
their claims, their success in obtaining the court order was exceptional enough
to justify the award of an approximately $7000 bonus to the plaintiffs' attorney,
in addition to an award of attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of
$53,000. Id. 9444, at 5048.
[Vol. 24
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bonuses are disfavored by the Court and should only be awarded in
rare circumstances.27
More recently, in Farrar v. Hobby,8 the Court held that when
a civil rights plaintiff is awarded only nominal damages, he has
failed to prove a compensable injury29 and is therefore not entitled
to attorney's fees.30 The Court reasoned that the damages awarded
in a civil rights action "[are] designed 'to compensate injuries caused
by the ... deprivation' [of civil rights]"; 3 therefore, "[w]hen a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages," he has failed to prove an
essential element of his claim for monetary relief, and "the only
reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." ' a2
While the above guidelines are certainly useful to district courts
attempting to determine the amount of reasonable fees to be awarded
under the Act, they offer minimal assistance to courts faced with
27. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
478 U.S. 546 (1986). The Court opined that because a lawyer is obligated to
perform to the best of his ability for his client, the lawyer should not receive
a fee enhancement for doing so. Id. at 565-66. Further, because an attorney's
skill, the complexity of the case, and the results obtained are all factors which
are considered when calculating the lodestar amount, the Court felt that such
factors should not serve as independent bases for enhancing the fee award. Id.
On reargument to determine whether an enhancement was appropriate as
a means of compensating the plaintiff's attorney for assuming the risk of loss
in the case, the Court opined that an enhancement is inappropriate when the
client is obligated to pay attorney's fees whether the case is won or lost.
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711, 715 n.3, 716 (1987).
28. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
29. Id. at 575.
30. Id. In Farrar, the Supreme Court upheld the reversal of an award of approx-
imately $300,000 in attorney's fees and expenses to a plaintiff who sought
$17,000,000 in damages, but was awarded only $1. Id. at 570-71, 575. The
plaintiff "asked for a bundle and got a pittance. While ... this pittance is
enough to render him a prevailing party, it does not by itself prevent his
victory from being purely technical." Id. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 575 (quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
309 (1986) (quoting Carrey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 265 (1978))) (emphasis in
original).
32. In a concurring opinion in Farrar, Justice O'Connor suggested consideration
of the following factors to determine whether a party's victory is nominal or
de minimis: (1) the differences between the judgment recovered and the
judgment sought, (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff
prevailed, and (3) the public purpose served by the litigation. Id. at 578-79
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Applying these factors to the circumstances of the
case, Justice O'Connor concluded that it was proper to deny all reasonable
attorney's fees. Id. at 579. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the difference
between the $17,000,000 sought and the $1 obtained was significant, that
recovering $1 lacked legal significance, and that because an award of $1 would
not deter future lawless conduct, the litigation served no public purpose. Id.
at 578-79.
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determining whether the requested attorney's fees are grossly exces-
sive.
B. The Lower Courts
Because the Supreme Court has not defined grossly excessive
fees in the context of the Act,33 the lower courts have established
their own definitions and boundaries regarding such fees. The Fourth
Circuit has held that a fee request is grossly excessive when it "shocks
the conscience of the court." 34 In the Seventh Circuit, grossly exces-
sive fees are those which are "obviously inflated to an intolerable
degree."" West Virginia 6 and Minnesota17 apply the prudent lawyer
standard,3 8 where a clearly excessive fee39 is found to exist "when,
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a
reasonable fee."40
33. See supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
34. Fair Hous. Council v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1993). The "shocks
the conscience of the court" standard originated over 60 years ago in a
workmen's compensation case in which the California supreme court opined:
"[l]f a fee is charged so exorbitant and wholly disproportionate to the services
performed as to shock the conscience of those to whose attention it is called,
such a case warrants disciplinary action by this court." In re Goldstone, 6
P.2d 513, 516 (Cal. 1931). In Goldstone, the court's conscience was shocked
when an attorney, whose client was awarded $882.96, charged $310 for services
which consisted of reviewing the client's workmen's compensation file, con-
tacting the insurance carrier, and travelling with the client to the insurance
carrier's office to retrieve the client's check. Id. at 513, 515.
35. Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 89-95
and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Committee on Legal Ethics v. Gallaher, 376 S.E.2d 346, 348 (W.
Va. 1988) (ordering the attorney to pay $750 in restitution to the client from
whom the attorney collected a 5007o contingency fee of $2250 in a tort action).
37. See, e.g., Thornton, Sperry & Jensen, Ltd. v. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d 467, 469
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the district court's reduction of fees awarded
by jury from $71,297.81 to $29,350, after the attorney charged the client
$92,855 in a partition action).
38. The prudent lawyer standard is the objective standard relied upon by the Code
of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-106(B) (1980).
39. Because the determination of whether fees are grossly excessive or clearly
excessive are seemingly interrelated, these terms are used interchangeably
throughout this Comment.
40. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B).
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III. THE TREATMENT OF GROSSLY EXCESSIVE FEE
REQUESTS BY THE LOWER COURTS
Just as the lower courts' definitions of grossly excessive fees
vary, so too does their treatment of those fees. In the First, 41 Fourth,42
and Seventh 43 Circuits, district courts may deny reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing litigant when the fee request is grossly exces-
sive." Courts in other jurisdictions have merely reduced the grossly
excessive fees to an amount considered reasonable. 45 Each of these
treatments is separately explored in this Comment.
41. See Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991); see also infra notes
52-62 and accompanying text.
42. See Fair Hous. Council v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 97-98 (4th Cir. 1993); see
also infra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
43. See Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980); see also infra
notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
44. Other circuits have indicated that they might deny requests for attorney's fees
under the Act upon the presentation of facts justifying such action, which
might include a denial based upon grossly excessive fees. See, e.g., Hall v.
Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1984) (deciding that Brown,
612 F.2d 1057, was inapplicable in a case where requested fees were merely
excessive and not grossly exaggerated); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (opining that when
a fee request is not supported with contemporaneous time records, a denial of
all fees may be justified); see also Keener v. Department of the Army, 136
F.R.D. 140, 150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (denying an award of grossly exaggerated
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) to the prevailing plaintiff
in a Title VII civil rights case), aff'd, 956 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992). Although
the Sixth Circuit has not had the occasion to decide the consequences of filing
a request for grossly excessive fees in the context of the Act, it denied attorney's
fees under a similar statute in Keener, where the plaintiff's attorney kept sloppy
time records, exaggerated his hourly rate by 33%, billed two government
agencies for the same work, and on several occasions claimed more than 24
billable hours in one day. Keener, .136 F.R.D. at 144-49.
45. See, e.g., Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 5 F.3d 319, 324-35 (1993)
(reducing the amount of the fee award by 70% because success was limited;
the fee was also reduced because the attorney sought reimbursement for
computer-based legal research, which is typically part of attorney's overhead
that should be reflected in hourly rate); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231,
236 (2d Cir. 1985) (remanding for recalculation of the attorney's fee, where
192 of the 302 hours billed by the attorney were clearly excessive); Ladies Ctr.,
Inc. v. Thone, 645 F.2d 645, 646-48 (8th Cir. 1981) (reducing fees from the
requested amount of approximately $250,000 to $30,000 because the attorney
was inefficient, engaged in duplicative efforts, and the request was generally
excessive); McKevitt v. City of Meriden, 822 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Conn. 1993)
(reducing requested fees from $150,000 to $11,800 due to the plaintiff's low
degree of success); Dillenbeck v. Hayes, 830 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (N.D.N.Y.
1993) (reducing requested fees of $29,101.50 to $2,118.50 because of the
duplicative and unnecessary efforts of two attorneys, when one would have
been sufficient, and because of the low quality of the legal representation);
Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F. Supp. 1544, 1547-53 (D. Utah 1993) (reducing
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Because not every jurisdiction has had an opportunity to address
excessive fee requests in the context of civil rights litigation, it is
also helpful to look beyond the civil rights arena to see how courts
have interpreted and remedied grossly excessive fee requests in other
matters. In other types of civil actions, many courts have invoked
disciplinary measures against attorneys who have submitted grossly
excessive fee requests.4 Those disciplinary measures range from re-
quiring an attorney to refund the excessive fees47 to ordering that the
attorney be suspended 48 or disbarred. 49
requested fees from $661,987.44 to $69,656.37 because of the plaintiff's limited
success, the failure to adequately document time, and the failure to limit
excessive rates for out-of-state attorneys).
46. See, e.g., Keener, 136 F.R.D. at 151. The Keener court assessed sanctions
against an attorney who submitted a fee request with outrageously inflated
hours. Id. at 151. The court reasoned that the submission violated the Rule
11 requirement that all papers submitted to a court be well-grounded in fact.
Id. at 150-51. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
every paper submitted to the court by a party represented by counsel must be
signed by the attorney of record. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The attorney's
signature is an affirmation that the attorney has read the paper, and that the
material contained therein is well-grounded in fact to the best of the attorney's
knowledge. See id. If a paper is signed in violation of Rule 11, the court shall
impose an appropriate sanction upon the individual who signed the paper. See
id. In Keener, the attorney's sanction was the completion of a course in legal
ethics. Keener, 136 F.R.D. at 151. Although Keener was a Title VII civil rights
case, where the award of fees is controlled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), both
that statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) authorize "the court, in its discretion,
[to] allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988). In addition, "[a]lthough [42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k)] and § 1988 are separate and distinct statutory bases for awards of
attorney's fees, both employ the 'prevailing party' concept and both have
received similar construction." Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1381 n.3 (lth
Cir. 1982).
47. See, e.g., Committee On Legal Ethics v. Gallaher, 376 S.E.2d 346, 351 (W.
Va. 1988) (ordering restitution and publicly reprimanding an attorney who
charged a 50%o contingency fee in a tort case); In re Kinast, 357 N.W.2d 282,
286-87 (Wis. 1984) (ordering a refund of the excessive fee, a public reprimand,
and the payment of the costs of the disciplinary proceedings).
48. See, e.g., In re Goldstone, 6 P.2d 513, 516 (Cal. 1931) (ordering a three month
suspension for an attorney who charged clearly excessive fees in a workmen's
compensation case); In re Richardson, 602 A.2d 179, 182 (D.C. 1992) (sus-
pending an attorney for 91 days because he charged clearly excessive fees in
an estate action); In re Gerard, 634 N.E.2d 51, 53-54 (Ind. 1994) (ordering
one year suspension for an attorney who charged a client clearly excessive fees
to recover a certificate of deposit; although fraudulent conduct was also present,
collecting an excessive fee was alone sufficient to warrant discipline); In re
Farmer, 747 P.2d 97, 100 (Kan. 1987) (ordering a one year suspension for an
attorney who collected excessive fees in a tort case; the attorney was also
ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examina-
tion), reinstatement granted, 767 P.2d 1319 (1989); In re Tobin, 628 N.E.2d
1268, 1273 (Mass. 1994) (ordering an 18 month suspension for an attorney
who charged excessive fees and made false and fraudulent statements while
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Where fees are grossly excessive because they contain requests
for costs unrelated to the litigation, many courts have not hesitated
to disallow the non-compensable costs.5 0 Although the inclusion of
non-compensable costs in an attorney's fee request is generally not
singularly sufficient to mandate the denial of reasonable attorney's
fees, when non-compensable costs are coupled with other deficiencies,
a denial of all requested fees may result."
A. Jurisdictions That Deny Fees When the Request Is Grossly
Excessive
1. The First Circuit
The First Circuit is one of three circuits that expressly recognizes
a district court's discretion to deny all fees to a prevailing litigant
under the Act if the fee request is grossly excessive. 2 As the court
handling a probate estate).
In Maryland, an attorney who charged his client in excess of a 50%
contingency fee in a tort case received an 18 month suspension. Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 672, 569 A.2d 1224, 1237 (1990).
The Korotki court reasoned that in a tort case, a contingency fee in excess of
50o will generally be considered clearly excessive, because at that level of
compensation the attorney's interest in the case will exceed the client's interest.
See id. at 665, 569 A.2d at 1233-34.
49. Disbarment is ordinarily an extreme sanction that is justified when other
aggravating circumstances are present, such as conversion of client funds. See,
e.g., Florida Bar v. Della-Donna, 583 So. 2d 307, 308-09, 312 (Fla. 1991)
(ordering a five year disbarment for charging clearly excessive fees, intentionally
misusing estate funds, and a conflict of interest); In re Swiggum, 125 N.W.2d
169 (Minn. 1963) (disbarring an attorney for conversion of client funds and
charging excessive fees); Mississippi State Bar Ass'n v. Moyo, 525 So. 2d 1289,
1298-99 (Miss. 1988) (disbarring an attorney for solicitation of a minor client,
conversion of client funds, and charging excessive fees in a tort case).
50. See, e.g., Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F. Supp. 1544, 1550 (D. Utah 1993)
(denying reimbursement of expenses for placement of propagandist advertising
in newspapers over 2,000 miles from the site of trial, lobbying legislators, and
holding press conferences) (see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text);
Pontarelli v. Stone, 781 F. Supp. 114, 123 (D.R.1. 1992) (denying fees resulting
from time spent on another case and for lobbying the state legislature) (see
infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text); Keener, 136 F.R.D. at 143 (denying
fees for work unrelated to a Title VII claim, including services performed in
connection with the sale of the plaintiff's home, an automobile accident, and
social security and civil service retirement claims) (see supra note 46).
51. See, e.g., Keener, 136 F.R.D. at 149-50 (denying all requested fees because of
poor documentation, double-billing, unnecessary efforts, entering into a fee
splitting agreement with client, and requesting reimbursement of unrelated
expenses) (see supra note 46 and accompanying text); Pontarelli, 781 F. Supp.
at 125 (denying all requested fees because of insufficient documentation,
misrepresentations, and unrelated expenses) (see infra notes 63-69 and accom-
panying text).
52. The remaining two circuits are the Fourth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. See
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observed in Lewis v. Kendrick," "[tihe fee provisions in [the Act]
are intended to enable injured parties to obtain counsel, not to enable
counsel to obtain munificent fees. ' 54 The plaintiff in Lewis filed an
action against the City of Brockton and two of its police officers
alleging a host of constitutional violations and the violation of certain
state law claims." The total amount of damages sought by the
plaintiff's action was $300,000.56
Following a ten day trial, the jury returned a special verdict
against the police officers under section 1983, and awarded the
plaintiff $1000.11 Although this was the sole civil rights claim upon
which the plaintiff prevailed, the plaintiff was nevertheless entitled
to submit a request for attorney's fees under the Act. 8 The plaintiff's
request resulted in an award of over $50,000 in attorney's fees and
expenses .9
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the award of attorney's
fees, observing that the "[p]laintiff . . . failed entirely, or largely, in
everything."'60 Under the circumstances, the court thought it was
outrageous that the plaintiff's counsel submitted a fee request charg-
ing the full 952.25 hours expended .on the plaintiff's case, without
making a downward adjustment of those hours due to the plaintiff's
limited success. 6' While the First Circuit acknowledged that the denial
of the entire amount of fees was "strong medicine," it reasoned that
because requested attorney's fees are "required to be in good faith
and in reasonable compliance with judicial pronouncements, and not
discussion infra parts III.A.2-3. Three other circuits have indicated that they
might deny attorney's fees under the Act if presented with a suitable case. See
supra note 44.
53. 944 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 956.
55. Id. at 951.
56. Id.
57. Id. The remaining claims against the officers were either dismissed or the
plaintiffs did not prevail upon those claims. Id. The jury also rendered a
verdict against the city on the plaintiff's negligence claim and awarded $3000.
Id.
58. See id. at 956.
59. See id. at 951.
60. Id. at 955. Although the plaintiff's complaint contained numerous allegations
of constitutional violations, all that was proven during the trial was a "simple
street arrest and detention for bail, based on a mistaken assessment of probable
cause in a two-party altercation." Id. at 956.
61. Id. The court's disdain for the plaintiff's counsel is perhaps best demonstrated
by the following passage:
To turn a single wrongful arrest into a half year's work, and seek
payment therefor, with costs, amounting to 140 times the worth of
the injury, is, to use a benign word, inexcusable. We should not
tolerate, even by a partial award, such an imposition by counsel on
the defendants, and on the court. In the exercise of the statutory
discretion, we reverse the award of fees altogether.
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an opening gambit in negotiations to reach an ultimate result," such
relief was appropriate.6 2
Although predicated upon different grounds, a denial of all
requested fees was also found to be warranted by the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island in Pontarelli v. Stone.63
In Pontarelli, a prevailing plaintiff submitted a request for attorney's
fees pursuant to the Act, in which fees of $511,951 and costs of
$203,268.28 were requested. 65 All of the requested fees and expenses
were denied when a review of the attorney's fee application disclosed
certain misrepresentations made by the plaintiff's attorney 66 and the
attorney's failure to keep contemporaneous time records. 6 The court
also criticized the request for compensation of non-compensable
fees. 6 Finally, the court invited the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of
62. Id. at 958 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Breyer
(now Supreme Court Justice Breyer) opined that the court of appeals should
not mandate fee denial, but should allow the district court the discretion to
determine whether such a denial is appropriate when the requested fees are
excessive. Id. at 959 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Judge Breyer observed that "[o]ther
courts of appeals have permitted district courts -to find that overreaching
constitutes a 'special circumstance' warranting fee forfeiture; they have not
required a district court to do so." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hall v.
Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1984) and Brown v. Stackler,
612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis in the original). Judge Breyer
further suggested that when a plaintiff achieves a token victory, as the plaintiffs
did in Lewis, it would be reasonable for the district court to award a token
attorney's fee. See id. at 956, 959 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. 781 F. Supp. 114 (D.R.I. 1992).
64. Id. at 117-18. Because the plaintiff's -suit against one of the defendants was
totally unfounded, the court awarded attorney's fees to that defendant. Id. at
126-27.
65. Id. at 118.
66. Id. at 122-23. Specifically, the time records maintained by the plaintiff's
attorney claimed more than 24 billable hours in a single day, and sought the
reimbursement of travel expenses on days during which the attorney had
previously asserted that she was hospitalized. Id. at 121-22.
67. Id. During the fee request hearing, the plaintiff's attorney admitted that the
time records she submitted were estimates of the time spent on the case and
that those estimates were made as late as three years after the services were
performed. Id. In determining that the failure to submit contemporaneous time
records was sufficient to justify a denial of all attorney's fees, the court
followed the First Circuit's policy that except in extraordinary circumstances,
the absence of detailed contemporaneous time records will result in either a
substantial reduction in awarded fees or, in egregious cases, the denial of all
requested fees. Id. at 120-21 (citing Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d
945, 952 (1st Cir. 1984)). In Grendel's Den, the requested attorney's fees and
expenses of successful civil rights litigants were reduced from the over $250,000
awarded by the district court to approximately $114,000. Grendel's Den, 749
F.2d at 948-49, 960. Although the defendants argued on appeal that the
requested fees were grossly excessive, the court consistently characterized the
request as excessive. Id. at 949, 953-55.
68. Pontarelli, 781 F. Supp. at 123. The plaintiff's request for attorney's fees
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to investigate the plaintiff's attorney
for possible disciplinary action relating to the fee request.69
2. The Fourth Circuit
In one of the more recent decisions to address grossly excessive
fees under the Act, the Fourth Circuit held that district courts have
the discretion to deny all fees in civil rights cases when the fee
request is grossly excessive. 70 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that af-
fording such discretion to the district court is necessary to discourage
greed;7 otherwise, if a claimant knew that submitting an unreasonable
request would merely result in the denial of any excessive fees, there
would be no incentive for the claimant to act reasonably in submitting
the fee request in the first instance.7
The court's decision arose in the context of litigation commenced
by the Fair Housing Council (the. FHC) against the owner of an
apartment building, alleging, inter alia, the violation of certain pro-
visions of both the Fair Housing Act73 and the Civil Rights Act.74
The only claim upon which the FHC prevailed was its claim that the
defendant breached the terms of a prior settlement agreement between
the parties. 75 Because the FHC succeeded on at least one of its claims,
included a request for time that the attorney spent on a separate case and for
time spent by the attorney while lobbying the Rhode Island General Assembly
for legislation favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
69. Id. at 127.
70. Fair Hous. Council v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1993). In reaching
its conclusion, the court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Farrar v.
Hobby and Hensley v. Eckerhart. See supra notes 16, 18-26, 28-32 and
accompanying text. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court
must consider "the degree of the plaintiff's overall success," Landow, 999
F.2d at 97 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574 (1992)), and that
"work on [the] unsuccessful claim[s] cannot be deemed to have been expended
in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved." Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
71. Id. at 96-97.
72. Id. at 98.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1988). Specifically, it was alleged that the defendant
violated the plaintiffs' civil rights by discriminating against blacks in providing
housing opportunities. Landow, 999 F.2d at 94.
75. Landow, 999 F.2d at 94-95. The court granted specific performance by entering
an order that required Landow to comply with all of the terms of the settlement
agreement. Id. However, the court denied the FHC's request for compensatory
and punitive damages because it failed to prove that any damages resulted
from Landow's breach of the settlement agreement. Id. The court also denied
the FHC's request for attorney's fees arising from Landow's breach, reasoning
that Maryland law does not provide for such an award in simple contract
cases. Id.
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it submitted a request for attorney's fees and expenses in the total
amount of $537,113.76
While the district court did not dispute that the FHC was entitled
to recover reasonable attorney's fees as the prevailing plaintiff under
the Act, it declared that "if there are motions for attorneys' fees
and expenses that should be disallowed in their entirety simply
because of the* outrageously excessive amount requested, the ...
[plaintiff's] motion would fit the bill."" Notwithstanding this senti-
ment, the court refused to deny the fee request in its entirety,
believing that such a denial would be overturned by the court of
appeals.7 8 The district court instead awarded the FHC the sum of
$20,000, opining that this amount was a reasonable fee for a five
day trial involving a relatively simple and straightforward contract
dispute.79
When the FHC appealed the $20,000 fee award to the Fourth
Circuit, the award was overturned. 80 In examining whether the district
court was justified in denying the FHC's fee request in its entirety,
the Fourth Circuit answered in the affirmative.8 Where, despite its
limited success, the FHC excluded only a small portion of its fees
and failed to specifically allocate those fees between successful and
unsuccessful claims, the court of appeals asserted that the FHC
"intended to submit an outrageously excessive fee petition in the
hope that the district court would at least award some, preferably
high, percentage of the requested fees." 8 2
In an effort to prevent future maneuvers of this nature by the
prevailing parties in civil rights litigation, the court of appeals cau-
tioned those parties to submit only reasonable fee requests and to
76. Id. Although the FHC claimed that it incurred fees and expenses of $604,113,
it voluntarily deducted $67,000 in fees that were attributable to its unsuccessful
claims. Id. The court observed, however, that the FHC's fee request failed to
identify the type of work and resulting fees which it excluded from the fee
request. Id. Rather, the FHC's time sheets contained only general descriptions
of the work performed. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court was apparently referring to the fact that the FHC only prevailed
on the contract dispute. See id. at 98. Had the FHC prevailed on its racial
discrimination claims, it likely would have been entitled to a higher award,
since the court noted that the FHC devoted the overwhelming majority of its
time attempting to prove that Landow discriminated against blacks. See id. at
94, 98.
80. Id. at 98-99. The district court noted, however, that "should this matter be
appealed and the appellate court find that this court had discretion to deny
all legal fees here, the award of legal fees made herein should be rescinded
without remand." Id. at 95.
81. Id. at 96.
82. Id. at 98.
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provide the necessary assistance to enable the district court to deter-
mine a reasonable fee.83 At a minimum, the prevailing party
must make every effort to submit time records which spe-
cifically allocate the time spent on each [of its] claim[s]
.... [T]hose records should [also] attempt to specifically
describe the work which the fee applicant allocated to
unsuccessful claims so as to assist the district court in
determining the reasonableness of the fee request. 84
Although the court recognized the difficulties which might be en-
countered in allocating fees among successful and unsuccessful claims,
especially where those claims spring from a common core of facts,85
the court asserted that such difficulties should not excuse a claimant
from making a good faith effort to separate and detail the fees. 86
3. The Seventh Circuit
Of the three jurisdictions that deny fees when the request is
grossly excessive,' the Seventh Circuit has perhaps been the most
inclined to deny the entire amount of fees."8 The first case in which
the Seventh Circuit denied all requested fees was Brown v. Stackler, 9
a case in which the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Illinois
statutes prohibiting the advertising of prescription eyeglass prices. 9°
Although the plaintiff's counsel was aware of a similar case pending
before the Supreme Court that would directly impact the plaintiff's
83. Id.
84. Id. at 97.
85. Id.
86. Id. Although a prevailing party may contend that the unsuccessful claims
sprang from the same common core of facts as the successful claims, thereby
making it impossible to allocate the fees among the claims, the court of appeals
warned that "blind adherence to this argument runs the risk of incurring a
complete denial of fees." Id.
87. In addition to the Seventh Circuit, both the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit
deny fees when the request is grossly excessive. See supra notes 52-86 and
accompanying text.
88. The Seventh Circuit has not, however, mandated this result. See, e.g., Roe v.
City of Chicago, 586 F. Supp. 513, 514 (N.D. III. 1984) (reducing an excessive
fee request to a reasonable amount); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co., 518 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (reducing an excessive fee request by
a factor of 12 to a reasonable amount), aff'd, 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1100 (1981); Forkes v. Busse, 510 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (awarding fees notwithstanding their excessiveness, because the fee shifting
statute applicable to illegal wiretapping used the mandatory language of "shall
award" rather than the discretionary language of "may award").
89. 612 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 1058.
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case,9' counsel nevertheless expended over 800 hours on the plaintiff's
behalf. 92
In reviewing the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that because an expenditure of over 800 hours was
unreasonable in light of the pending Supreme Court case, a denial
of all fees was appropriate. 93 The court opined that "it was utterly
unreasonable [for the plaintiff's attorney] to expend . . . [800 hours]
on a plain and simple case, which would almost automatically be
disposed of by the decision in the . . . [Virginia Pharmacy] case
whose determination was being awaited." 94 By denying the requested
fees, the court hoped to "encourag[e] counsel to maintain adequate
records and submit reasonable, carefully calculated, and conscien-
tiously measured claims when seeking statutory counsel fees." 95
The Seventh Circuit recently revisited the issue of excessive
attorney's fees in Cartwright v. Stamper.96 In Cartwright, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the Indiana State Police violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by unlawfully entering their apartment. 97 The jury
agreed that the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated,
but awarded nominal damages totalling five dollars. 9
Following the jury's verdict, the plaintiffs submitted a request
for attorney's fees in the amount of $111,851.75. 99 After performing
the lodestar analysis recommended by Hensley v. Eckerhart,1° ° the
district court reduced the requested fees to $79,312.50.101 This amount
was further reduced by one-third, to $52,875, because the plaintiffs
were not successful on all of their claims. 0 2 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees, 03
91. Id. at 1058-59. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976), the plaintiff was also challenging a state statute prohibiting the
advertising of prescription eyeglass prices. Brown, 612 F.2d at 1058-59. Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia Pharmacy had a favorable
impact on the plaintiff's claim in Brown. Id.
92. Brown, 612 F.2d at 1059.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 7 F.3d 106 (7th Cir. 1993).
97. Id. at 107. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from illegal searches
and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The unlawful entry into a person's home
may constitute an illegal search or seizure depending upon whether the police
search the premises or arrest the occupants. See Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 107.
98. Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 107-08.
99. Id. at 108.
100. 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983); see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
101. Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 108.
102. Id. at 107-08.
103. Id. at 109-10.
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reasoning that the plaintiff's victory was de minimis.' °
The Seventh Circuit has also denied all attorney's fees when the
prevailing plaintiff unnecessarily prolonged the litigation, thus accru-
ing higher fees. 105 Finally, the Seventh Circuit has awarded attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant for the defense of frivolous state law
claims arising from the same common core of facts as the plaintiff's
frivolous civil rights claims. 106
B. Jurisdictions That Reduce or Recalculate Grossly Excessive
Fees to a Reasonable Amount
1. The Second Circuit
The leading case in the Second Circuit involving excessive fee
requests in civil rights litigation is DiFilippo v. Morizio, 7 where the
104. Id. at 110. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's victory was de
minimis based upon its application of the three factors recommended for such
a determination by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Farrar v.
Hobby. Id. at 109-10 (referring to Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992));
see also supra note 32. Specifically, the Cartwright court found that: (1) there
was a vast difference between the substantial compensatory and punitive
damages sought by the plaintiff and the five dollars in damages actually
awarded; (2) the significance of the legal issue slightly favored the plaintiffs
because the jury found that the defendant had violated their Fourth Amendment
rights; and (3) because the jury did not award punitive damages, the litigation
did not serve a public purpose. Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 109-10. After weighing
these factors, the court held that factors one and three weighed heavily in
favor of the determination that the plaintiff's victory was de minimis. Id. at
110.
105. See Vocca v. Playboy Hotel of Chicago, Inc., 686 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1982).
The litigation in Vocca was unnecessarily prolonged by a plaintiff who rejected
an early settlement offer that was close to the amount upon which the parties
ultimately agreed. Id. at 606-07; cf. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d
540, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the rejection of a settlement offer on
the morning of trial does not unnecessarily prolong litigation and should not
result in the denial of fees). In addition to accruing higher fees, the plaintiff
in Vocca submitted documentation which was insufficient to support its fee
request. Vocca, 686 F.2d at 607. One deficiency was the failure to separate
the attorney's hours from clerical hours at a lower billing rate. Id.; cf. FMC
Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1316-18 (7th Cir. 1990) (overturning a denial
of all fees where the prevailing party submitted all of its time records to the
court in anticipation that the court would calculate the time reasonably ex-
pended on its successful claims; reasoning that the plaintiff should be given
an opportunity to organize and simplify its fee request).
106. See Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Directors, 969 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that allegations of civil rights violations stemming from a
wrongful discharge were frivolous and groundless where the plaintiff was
discharged from his job as a school principal because he violated school board
regulations).
107. 759 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1985).
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plaintiff was awarded $2250 against a landlord that intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race. 08 When the
plaintiff submitted a request for attorney's fees in the amount of
$27,832.82, the district court ordered a one-half reduction in those
fees because of the low amount of the plaintiff's recovery and the
straightforward and non-novel nature of the case.' °9
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the lower court's reduc-
tion of the fees merely because the amount of the plaintiff's recovery
was low. 10 However, after making an independent determination that
nearly two-thirds of the time that the plaintiff's counsel claimed to
have spent on the case was clearly excessive, the court remanded the
case to the district court to recalculate the allowable fees.' 1
The Second Circuit's preference for recalculating or reducing
excessive fees to an amount that is reasonable was recently under-
scored by two district court civil rights cases. In Dillenbeck v.
Hayes,"2 the district court reduced the requested attorney's fees by
a factor of fourteen after the plaintiff was awarded $1 on a $900,000
claim for cruel and unusual punishment." 3 Similarly, in McKevitt v.
City of Meriden,l" 4 the district court reduced the requested attorney's
fees by a factor of nine because the plaintiffs were not completely
successful on all of their claims."'
In an analysis peculiar to the Second Circuit, the court of appeals
has held that before determining whether a requested fee is reason-
able, the district court should determine whether the merits of a
plaintiff's claims were strong enough to cause the plaintiff's counsel
to recognize the high probability of a large damage award." 6 If so,
the district court has the discretion to deny fees. 1 7 The Second
Circuit bases this approach on the premise that awarding fees to
counsel who accepted a case because of the probability of a large
108. Id. at 233. The caucasian plaintiff in DiFilippo attempted to rent an apartment
from the defendant landlord, but was refused because her daughter, who would
share the apartment, was of mixed race. Id. The landlord's refusal to rent to
the plaintiff was based upon the desire to "keep the neighborhood white." Id.
109. Id. at 234-35.
110. Id. at 235.
111. Id. at 235-36.
112. 830 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
113. Id. at 676. The Dillenbeck court opined that such a reduction was appropriate
under the reasoning espoused by the Supreme Court in Farrar v. Hobby, 113
S. Ct. 566 (1992). Dillenbeck, 830 F. Supp. at 674-76; see also supra notes 28-
32 and accompanying text.
114. 822 F. Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1993).
115. Id. at 80-81. The sole plaintiff to recover on a civil rights claim was awarded
compensatory, but not punitive, damages. Id. at 80.
116. Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982).
117. Id.
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damage award would contravene one of the basic purposes of the
Act-to attract counsel to cases where the probable damages might
be otherwise unattractive." '
2. The Third Circuit
In Hall v. Borough of Roselle,' 9 the plaintiff's counsel submitted
a request for fees after obtaining a pre-trial settlement of the plain-
tiff's claims for compensatory damages.' 20 The amount of fees re-
quested was $26,375, representing 211 hours of services performed.' 2'
Despite the defendants' protest that such fees were unreasonable in
a "simple tort action for assault,"' 122 the district court awarded the
plaintiff $15,080 in fees and $595.10 in expenses.' 23 This award
included an additional $5000 bonus because "of the difficulties
inherent in this kind of case and the contingent nature of the fee,
depending as it must on recovery." 124
When the defendants appealed the award to the court of appeals,
they urged the application of Brown v. Stackler,125 which calls for
the denial of the entire fee request when the fees are grossly exces-
sive. 26 The court held that the application of Brown was inappro-
priate because the fees in the instant case were neither grossly
exaggerated nor absurd. 2 7 On the contrary, the court found that the
plaintiff's counsel had "undoubtedly expended the hours claimed but
... in some instances ... spent more time on various tasks than
118. Id. at 877-78.
119. 747 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 840. The settlement arose from allegations that Roselle police officers
violated the plaintiff's civil rights by assaulting him. Id. Prior to a trial on the
plaintiff's claim, the parties entered into a settlement. Id. at 841. The plaintiff
subsequently submitted its request for attorney's fees. Id. at 840. Citing the
difficult and contingent nature of the case, the district court added $5000 to
the lodestar figure. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court concluded that this amount of fees was appropriate by reducing
the hours for which compensation was sought from 211 to 125 hours, and
multiplying those hours by the $80 hourly rate which the court fixed as
reasonable based on the attorneys' experience and the nature of the litigation.
Id.
124. Id.
125. 612 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1980); see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
126. Hall, 747 F.2d at 841; see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
127. Hall, 747 F.2d at 842. Although the Hall court refused to follow Brown, it
cautioned lawyers that they are "quasi-officers of the court and . . . are
expected to be careful and scrupulously honest in their representations to the
court." Id. at 841-42. Considerations of judgment and ethical sensitivity in
billing may not be abandoned because fee responsibility is shifted under the
Act. Id. at 842.
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was reasonably necessary, or . . . spent [time] in connection with
other proceedings that did not directly contribute to this case."' 28
Although the court refused to deny all fees, it reduced the
plaintiff's award due to his counsel's failure to justify the amount
of the fees requested in view of the nature of the case. 129 Because
the case was relatively straightforward, the court further reduced the
fee award by the additional $5000 bonus authorized by the district
court. 130
3. The Eighth Circuit
In a pair of abortion rights cases, the Eighth Circuit approved
the district court's discretion to reduce the fee requests of prevailing
parties in civil rights litigation when the amounts requested were
excessive. 1 ' Specifically, in Ladies Center, Nebraska, Inc. v. Thone, 132
the court determined that a fee request of approximately $250,000
was extravagant and therefore upheld the district court's award of
$26,400.13 The court of appeals reasoned that the lower court's
recalculation of the fee was appropriate because the plaintiff's attor-
neys billed the defendant for time spent learning about abortion law
and for the duplicative efforts of multiple attorneys. 13 4 The recalcu-
lation was also warranted because the attorneys' inefficient use of
their time increased the amount of fees that would have been charged
had their time been used more efficiently. 135
The Eighth Circuit's approach to excessive fee requests was
recently reasserted in Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV School District.36
128. Id. at 842.
129. Id. at 843-44. Although not in the context of the Act, the Third Circuit has
held that if a court determines that a reduction in fees is warranted, a prevailing
plaintiff must reimburse its counsel for the difference between the fee awarded
and the contracted fee, if the contracted fee is contingent upon the plaintiff's
recovery. Sullivan v. Crown Paper Bd. Co., 719 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1983).
The award of attorneys' fees in Sullivan was made under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as controlled
by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988). Sullivan, 719 F.2d at 669 n.l. The Sullivan
court observed that "[i]t has been the practice of federal courts to treat the
various fee-shifting anti-discrimination statutes as governed by the same stan-
dards." Id. (citations omitted).
130. Hall, 747 F.2d at 843-44.
131. Ladies Ctr., Nebraska, Inc. v. Thone, 645 F.2d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1981);
Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 645 F.2d 649, 650 (8th Cir. 1981).
132. 645 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1981).
133. Id. at 648.
134. Id. at 647.
135. Ladies Ctr., 645 F.2d at 647-48. The court's conclusion that the attorneys
made inefficient use of their time was based upon its experience with the
amount of time usually required to prepare for a two week trial. Id.
136. 5 F.3d 319 (8th Cir. 1993).
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In Standley, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's reduc-
tion of attorney's fees by seventy percent because of the plaintiff's
limited success on the merits. 37 The court also approved the district
court's denial of expenses arising from computer-based legal research,
reasoning that such expenses "must be factored into the attorneys'
hourly rate."' 3
4. The Ninth Circuit
In the only civil rights case to come before the Ninth Circuit on
the issue of attorney's fees, the court of appeals treated excessive
and grossly excessive fees alike.13 9 In Cabrales v. County of Los
Angeles, 140 the court determined that the $250 hourly rate charged
by each of the plaintiff's two attorneys was excessive, and therefore
reduced the hourly rates to $225 and $175, respectively. 1 4' The court
also found that the 164.75 hours and 228.5 hours allegedly expended
on the case by the plaintiff's attorneys were grossly exaggerated, and
ordered a reduction of those hours to 115.75 hours and 120 hours,
respectively. 142
5. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue of
excessive fee requests under the Act. Nevertheless, in Jane L. v.
Bangerter, ' a case from within this circuit, the fees and expenses
requested by the plaintiff were reduced by a factor of ten because
of the plaintiff's limited success,'l" a lack of adequate documentation
137. Id. at 324.
138. Id. at 325.
139. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1091 (1989).
140. 875 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1987).
141. Id. at 740. The court noted that the plaintiff's attorneys were allowed $225
and $175 per hour for their trial representation, rather than the $250 per hour
they were seeking for their appellate representation. Id. Because the $225 and
'$175 hourly rates were reasonable, those were the rates that would be used to
calculate fees for the attorneys' appellate representation of the plaintiff. Id.
142. Id. at 740-41. The court did not elaborate as to why the hours claimed were
grossly exaggerated, but noted several entries on the attorneys' time sheets to
support its conclusion. Id.
143. 828 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Utah 1993). The plaintiff successfully challenged the
constitutionality of certain portions of Utah's Abortion Fee Act. Id. at 1547
& n.3 (referring to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301(2), 304(2) (1990 & Supp.
1992)).
144. Id. at 1553.
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to support the time allegedly expended by plaintiff's attorneys, 45 and
non-compensable fees and expenses. 146 Additionally, because the court
determined that several of the plaintiff's constitutional claims were
frivolous or meritless, the court awarded reasonable attorney's fees
to the defendant's attorneys for the cost of defending such claims. 147
In addition to the Third Circuit, 41 the Tenth Circuit has also
addressed the extent of a plaintiff's liability to his attorney when the
actual fees awarded are less than the fee the plaintiff contracted to
pay the attorney. 49 In Cooper v. Singer,50 the court of appeals held
that when a plaintiff's fee award is less than the attorney-client
contract fee in a contingency case, the attorney is expected to reduce
his fee to the amount of the plaintiff's fee award. 5' On the other
hand, if the plaintiff's fee award exceeds the amount the plaintiff
contracted to pay the attorney in a contingency case, the attorney is
entitled to the full amount of the award.5 2
6. The Eleventh Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also favors the
reduction of excessive fee requests to a more reasonable amount. In
145. Id. at 1548. The court instructed the attorneys that contemporaneous time
records "must reveal . . . all hours for which compensation is requested and
how those hours were allotted to specific tasks-for example, how many hours
were spent researching, how many interviewing the client, how many drafting
the complaint, and so on." Id. (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553
(10th Cir. 1983)).
146. Id. The non-compensable expenses included those that were incurred through
excessive travel between New York and Utah by New York lawyers when the
case was being adequately handled by local Utah counsel, id. at 1549; retaining
New York lawyers who charged twice the hourly rate of similarly skilled Utah
counsel, id. at 1551-52; holding press conferences, id. at 1550; lobbying
legislators, id.; and preparing propagandist advertising. Id. at 1550 n.8.
147. Id. at 1554-57. Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff's claim that her
right to an abortion was protected by the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude was without merit. Id. at 1554. The plaintiff's
claim that Utah's Abortion Fee Act violated the Establishment Clause because
its preamble embodied a prohibited religious viewpoint, and because it mirrored
the position of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints concerning
the rights of the unborn, was also viewed as frivolous in light of a recent
Supreme Court decision regarding a similar statute. Id. at 1555 (referring to
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)).
148. See supra note 129.
149. Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1506-07. The Cooper court reasoned that the intention of Congress was
that fee awards under the Act should "fulfill the -client's fee obligation" to
the attorney. Id. at 1504. The Cooper decision is diametric to the Third
Circuit's decision in Sullivan v. Crown Paper Board Co., 719 F.2d 667 (3d
Cir. 1983). See supra note 129.
152. Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1507.
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the case of Loranger v. Stierheim,'53 the plaintiff appealed a district
court order awarding attorney's fees of $50,400 upon a request for
fees and expenses in excess of $950,000.1'1 The primary reason for
the reduction was the district court's inability to separate the hours
that the plaintiff's attorney devoted to compensable and non-com-
pensable claims.
55
On appeal, the court agreed that the district court should not
have undertaken the "imprecise and tortuous task of determining
compensable hours based on ...[the plaintiff's] fee request."' 56 The
court noted, however, that notwithstanding the "patently excessive"
fees, 15 the district court should have required the plaintiff to resubmit
his fee request in a manner that would allow the court to separate
fees and expenses among the compensable and non-compensable civil
rights claims. 58
As for the method of recalculation, the court of appeals ex-
plained that "[w]hen faced with a massive fee application .. . an
hour-by-hour review is both impractical and a waste of judicial
resources."' 5 9 Accordingly, the court opined that it would be suffi-
cient for the district court "to provide a concise but clear explanation
of its reasons" for any reductions in requested attorney's fees. 6' The
district court does not have to engage in a detailed analysis to
determine the number of reasonable hours expended by the attorney
on the successful claims.' 6'
IV. APPROPRIATENESS OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES
An individual who files a civil rights claim against another party
generally does so because that individual believes that he has been
treated unfairly. Although the individual's underlying objective is
generally to protect his own civil rights and remedy past violations,
the civil rights of other individuals are often protected through any
legal victory. Perhaps this is why Congress has referred to the
individuals who file civil rights claims as "private attorney gen-
153. 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994). This civil rights dispute arose when officials of
Dade County, Florida issued citations to the plaintiff that required him to cut
a 30 foot hedge on his property. Id. at 778.
154. Id. at 779.
155. Id. at 782.
156. Id.
157. The court made its "patently excessive" determination based upon its evaluation
of the amount of time required to prepare for cases of this nature. Id.
158. Id. at 782.
159. Id. at 783.
160. Id.
161. Id. Because the defendant did not seek a denial of fees, the court did not
discuss this remedy for dealing with excessive fee requests. Id. at 782 n.8.
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eral[s]," upon whom the government relies to enforce our civil
rights.162
Unfortunately, the enforcement of civil rights is made more
difficult for these private attorney generals if they cannot find counsel
willing to represent them in court. If the potential attorneys are
confronted with the possible denial of their fees, they may be
understandingly hesitant to represent indigent clients, who are often
those most in need of such representation.1
63
Instead of unwittingly penalizing existing and potential civil
rights plaintiffs by denying attorney's fees when the amount requested
is grossly excessive, a more equitable solution would be for the
federal government to provide financial support to the private attor-
ney generals who enforce meritorious claims, even where those claims
result in either a de minimis victory or no victory at all. Using this
method of compensation, even if a plaintiff fails to prevail on any
of its claims, a determination that those claims were meritorious
could at least entitle the plaintiff to partial compensation from the
government at a predetermined rate.'6 By not discouraging the
litigation of meritorious civil rights claims, this solution would pro-
mote the public interest and offer a measure of protection to defen-
dants, who would not be required to assume the burden of a
plaintiff's legal bill when only a de minimis victory has been obtained.
Absent the adoption of such a solution, however, a defendant
in civil rights litigation still has the right to be treated fairly. Just as
a defendant is liable for damages for treating a plaintiff unfairly, so
162. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 57-5 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5910)).
163. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. But cf. Fair Hous. Council v.
Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 96-97 (4th Cir. 1993) (asserting that the denial of all
fees as penalty for grossly excessive fees will not adversely impact acceptance
of future cases by attorneys who rely upon fee awards to fund their represen-
tation in civil rights cases).
164. A similar proposal suggests that the court hold a pre-trial conference to
determine the merits of a plaintiff's claims. See Tim K. Garrett, Recent
Development, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees: Hensley's Path to Confusion, 39
VAN. L. REv. 359, 386-87 (1986). If a plaintiff later prevailed on claims
determined to be meritorious at the pre-trial conference, that plaintiff would
be entitled to receive the attorney's fees incurred in litigating those claims. Id.
at 387. Attorney's fees for claims determined at the pre-trial conference to be
of questionable merit would not be compensated unless the plaintiff prevailed
on those claims, in which case the plaintiff would be entitled to enhanced
attorney's fees. Id. The rationale behind this proposal is that if the plaintiff's
attorney knew in advance which claims would be compensable, he could not
pad his bill with requests for litigating claims of questionable merit. Id. at
388. This would then lessen the likelihood of excessive fee requests. Id.
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too should a plaintiff be liable to a defendant for unfair treatment.
When that unfair treatment takes the form of a plaintiff's request
for excessive legal fees, it seems only appropriate that the measure
of damages should be the complete denial of those fees.
Failure to adequately document a fee request is likewise unfair
to the defendant and creates an unnecessary burden for a court
determining a reasonable fee award. 165 Rather than arbitrarily reduc-
ing the requested fees or denying a reasonable fee award, the district
court should withhold any award of fees until the attorneys provide
the necessary documentation to support the amount requested.
Finally, although no court has yet denied reasonable attorney's
fees in civil rights litigation solely because certain fees and expenses
were deemed non-compensable,' 66 it seems appropriate to allow dis-
trict courts the discretion to deny all requested fees or exact an
otherwise substantial penalty against fee applicants who pad their
bills with clearly non-compensable expenses. 67 Without the discretion
to penalize, courts are without the power to adequately control the
unreasonable fee requests.
Within the foregoing analysis, of course, it is imperative to
recognize that a court should protect innocent litigants from being
penalized by their attorneys' attempts to overcharge the losing party.
If the attorney's fees are contingent upon the amount of the client's
recovery, or if the client was paying the attorney on an hourly basis
with the understanding that the client would be reimbursed from any
fees awarded, it would be reasonable for the court to fashion an
equitable attorney's fee. The calculation of this equitable amount
should include consideration of the amount of the plaintiff's recovery,
the plaintiff's ability to pay, 168 and the scope of the attorney's
misconduct. A plaintiff's liability could, therefore, range from paying
the entire amount of an equitable fee to having no liability whatso-
ever.
165. See supra notes 67, 84, 105, 145, 155.
166. See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text.
168. The increasing burden placed upon municipalities, and ultimately the taxpayers,
responsible for the payment of attorney's fees in civil rights litigation has led
to the proposal that the prevailing plaintiff should contribute to those fees if
the plaintiff receives a monetary award and such contribution would not result
in undue hardship. Orrin G. Hatch, The Legal Fees Equity Act: Relief to the
Attorneys' Fees Quagmire, 5 & 6 BENCHMARK 261, 262, 267 (1986). Among
Senator Hatch's additional proposals, which he introduced in S.B. 1580 during
the 99th Congress, are: (1) a cap on the hourly rate civil rights lawyers can
claim under the Act, (2) no fees subsequent to an offer of settlement if the
plaintiff rejects the offer and, upon prevailing, is not awarded a better
settlement, and (3) no award of fees until a judgment is final. Id. at 267.
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Alternatively, an extension of the holding in Cooper v. Singer169
could be applied. Although Cooper is limited to cases where a
contingent fee arrangement exists,' 70 under this alternative, regardless
of the fee arrangement, if there is no award of attorney's fees
because of an attorney's overreaching, the attorney would be required
to forfeit his fee. In any event, a client should not incur liability for
attorney's fees that, but for the attorney's overreaching, would
normally have been shifted to the losing party.
V. CONCLUSION
It is essential to maintain the dignity of the legal profession. If
the public views lawyers as being less than honest in their roles as
quasi-officers of the court, 17' even in matters concerning their fees,
the public's faith in the legal system will erode. The public might
then assume that it too is absolved from the responsibility of being
honest in dealings with the court.
Of course, in addition to protecting the dignity of the legal
profession, it is also important to protect the rights and interests of
the individual litigants before the court and the public at large. All
of these goals may be more easily achieved if the courts more sharply
define what constitutes a grossly excessive fee request under the Act.
Perhaps fee requests greater than ten times that which the district
court determines is reasonable should be presumed grossly excessive.
As evidenced by the relatively small number of cases involving fee
requests which were excessive by a factor of ten,' 72 such a requirement
should not adversely impact upon the availability of attorneys for
those civil rights plaintiffs who otherwise could not afford counsel.
Further, if attorneys make a greater effort to adhere to the Johnson
Factors173 when preparing their fee requests, they should remain
comfortably within the acceptable range of requested fees, and thus
avoid what might be considered a harsh denial of all fees.
169. 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
170. See Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1506-07.
171. Lawyers are "quasi-officers of the court and they are expected to be careful
and scrupulously honest in their representations to the court." Hall v. Borough
of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1984).
172. See Fair Hous. Council v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1993) (supra notes
70-86 and accompanying text); Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1991)
(supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text); Ladies Ctr., Nebraska, Inc. v.
Thone, 645 F.2d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1981) (supra notes 132-35 and accompanying
text); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (supra notes 89-95 and
accompanying text); Dillenbeck v. Hayes, 830 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text).
173. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (4th Cir.
1974); see also supra text accompanying note 19.
19941
176 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 24
At present, it is unnecessary for the Supreme Court to decide
whether the appropriate remedy for the submission of a grossly
excessive fee request is the denial of reasonable fees. Because there
is no true split among the federal circuit courts, the issue is not ripe
for consideration. In the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue,
the determination of whether to reduce or deny excessive fee requests
is a matter left to the discretion of the district court.
Bernard P. Codd
